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Abstract 
 
This paper focuses on how regions become entrepreneurial and the extent to which 
the actors in the triple helix model are dominant at particular stages in development.  
It uses the case studies of Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire in the UK to explore this 
theme. Both can now be described as ‘regional triple helix spaces’ (Etzkowitz 2008), 
and form two points of the Golden Triangle of Oxford, Cambridge and London 
universities. As entrepreneurial regions, however, they differ in a number of respects. 
This is not surprising given their differing geo-historical contexts. However, by 
comparing the two similar counties but which have their own distinctive features we 
are able to explore different dynamics which lead to the inception, implementation, 
consolidation and renewal (Etzkowitz and Klofsten 2005) of regions characterised by 
very high levels of technology-based entrepreneurship.  
 
 
Keywords: Entrepreneurship, Oxfordshire, Cambridgeshire, triple helix regions, 
innovating regions 
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1. Introduction 
 
Not only does the technological basis of each entrepreneurial region’s growth 
trajectory make them different from each other, but their performance also differs: 
some are better than others in creating firms and jobs. Silicon Valley is often seen as 
the epitome of success because of its sheer scale and technological diversity of 
activity. It remains unique: it is the home of companies which are changing our lives: 
Google, Apple, Facebook, and so on. These are companies with total revenues 
equivalent to some countries' GDPs.  
 
This paper focuses on two smaller entrepreneurial regions in the UK, Oxfordshire and 
the Cambridge sub-region.  Both regions are dominated by historic universities, 
Oxford and Cambridge, (often referred to collectively as Oxbridge), two of the 
world’s leading research universities. The paper addresses the research questions: 
how different are these apparently very similar sub-regions, in other words, how 
unique are they, and how successful are they?  
 
The paper shows that they are both leading locations of multiple clusters of high-tech 
firms, and in this respect they are not unique.  However, they could have been more 
successful in creating more and bigger firms. The thesis of the paper is that part of the 
explanation lies in the relative lack of engagement of their major assets (the 
universities) in leading economic development and thus in their regions becoming 
‘regional triple helix spaces’ (Etkowitz 2008). Other factors include planning 
constraints which are related to their status as heritage cities.  
 
The paper draws on a series of studies on the growth of Oxfordshire’s and 
Cambridgeshire’s high-tech economy since the mid-1980s (Lawton Smith 1990, 
Garnsey and Lawton Smith 1998, Waters and Lawton Smith 2002, Mohr and Garnsey 
2010, Breznitz 2011, Lawton Smith and Waters 2011).  These studies provide an 
historical perspective on the growth of the two economies, and points of comparison 
with other similar places such as Grenoble in France.  However, it is important that 
these two regions should be seen in their own terms as smaller centres of technology-
based enterprise and with populations well short of one million, rather than in 
comparison with metropolitan regions such as London which have very different 
urban economies.  Moreover, the actions of the Oxbridge universities should also be 
considered both in the light of the political importance of universities in playing 
leading roles in economic development (Lawton Smith 2006) and in the universities’ 
own interests in maintaining their global research positions.  The focus is therefore on 
process as well as performance in economic development.  
 
The paper proceeds by providing the framework for the discussion of Oxfordshire and 
the Cambridgeshire sub-regions as entrepreneurial regions. This is followed by an 
assessment of the qualities of the two regions and the extent of their being 
entrepreneurial using this framework. Finally, some conclusions are drawn. 
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  2. Entrepreneurial and innovating regions 
 
Centres of high technology industry including university city-regions such as Oxford 
and Cambridge are distinctive because of their high rates of entrepreneurship and 
innovation. The dynamism of such regions also reflects the ability and willingness of 
local actors (firms and organisations such as universities) to adapt to changing 
political and economic environments. This paper is concerned with how or how much 
the different elements which comprise an entrepreneurial region interact to create that 
dynamism. To explore this theme, a distinction is made between actions and their 
consequences from those of interconnected, systemic processes which have a 
localised impact through a series of what might be relatively exclusive networks and 
consequences operating at varying geographical scales. Conceptually a distinction can 
made between two kinds of analysis of regional development.  
 
The first is the less frequent interpretation of a non-systematic approach. 
Conceptualisations such as the triple helix model (Leydesdorff and Ektzowitz 1995) 
do not presume a geographically delineated system but provide a framework for 
analysis of systemness (and allow for mismatches between institutional arrangements 
and social functions within the model) (Leydesdorff and Zawdie 2010). This allows 
for the specificities of political and institutional/organisational environments. The 
second is where the analysis is couched in terms of stages or continuous evolution. 
There actions are taken systemically through a variety of interactions and whose 
consequences occur within a region. The dynamism of such places can be seen as 
resulting from path dependence, increasing returns and the lock-in phenomenon 
(Arthur 1992), systemic and contextual variables from non-systemic actions and 
agency. These include regional innovation systems approach and evolutionary 
economic geography (see Boschma and Frenken 2006). Clark et al (2002), however, 
point out the problems associated with assumptions of path dependence. They argue 
that there ‘is ample evidence of unrelated economic activities co-existing with core 
elements of successful industry-region complexes’ (p.162). 
 
The approach in this paper therefore is not to rely on systems thinking but to identify 
six key elements in a local economy related to its dynamism and where there are 
mismatches and events that do not have direct systemic effects (Table 1). These 
elements are drawn from three conceptualisations of dynamic regions: Feldman and 
Francis’s (2006) three stage process model in which entrepreneurs are the agents who 
drive the formation and shaping of clusters, ‘the innovating region’ (Etzkowitz and 
Klosten 2005) and ‘regional triple helix spaces’ (Etzkowitz 2008). These are 
supplemented by elements missing or underplayed in those three. 
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Entrepreneurs New firms,  
clusters,  
anchor firms 
Labour markets Skill profiles, mobility 
Universities and research instututions source of new firms by staff and students 
sources of knowledge 
attracting foreign science-based industry  
engagement in regional development 
Infrastructure Science parks and incubators 
Social interaction Formal and informal networks 
Government National and local 
Table 1 Core elements in framework for analysis 
 
Entrepreneurs, sectoral specialisations and anchor firms 
Entrepreneurs, in Feldman and Francis’ (2006) model and neglected in the triple helix 
model (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen 2010), are at the heart of innovation-led 
economic development.  This approach is placed within an adaptive systems model, 
one which is complementary to the triple helix model of cluster formation (Etzkowitz 
2000). Their three stages are: emergence, self-organisation, and a mature stage 
characterised by a well functioning system.  
 
The approach recognises that factors which promote a new cluster of firms in similar 
or related markets are different from those that encourage its growth. It is also 
evolutionary with its view that cluster development is path dependent or heavily 
influenced by chance historical events.  Feldman (2003) earlier noted that a further 
factor that encouraging growth is that of larger firms (anchor firms) which provide 
stability in a local economy and generate multiple effects such as adding skills to the 
local labour market, providing markets for specialised intermediate industries as well 
as knowledge spillovers. 
 
However, integral to understanding these processes are firm level factors such who 
they entrepreneurs are and what roles they play in shaping business strategy compared 
the inventors and to managers. This is important because it matters to relationships 
and interactions between actors within a local cluster. Schumpeter (1934) clearly 
distinguished these roles: the entrepreneur is as innovator is the pioneer of change by 
capitalising on new combinations of knowledge,  rather than being an inventor or a 
manager. 
 
Labour markets 
Related to high levels of entrepreneurship and innovation is the presence of a highly 
skilled labour market. This serves both as a source of entrepreneurs (Fritsch and 
Schindele 2012) and through inter-firm mobility particularly by the highly-skilled is a 
mechanism for technology transfer and fostering of inter-firm links (Breschi and 
Lissoni 2009, Faggian et al 2009).  Other studies have also suggested an association 
between high levels of in-migrant workers and entrepreneurship and innovation as is 
the case in Silicon Valley (Saxenian 2006). It is, however, important not to make a 
causal link between the presence of universities and that of a highly skilled labour 
market as other factors will also be at work in creating stocks and flows of the highly 
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skilled such as employment in the private sector with people being attracted into the 
county to work in the high tech firms as well the public sector (see Waters and 
Lawton Smith 2011).   
 
Universities 
In the ‘innovating region’ concept (Etzkowitz and Klosten 2005, 246) the university is 
placed at ‘the root of virtually any high tech region’. The focus in this ‘assisted linear 
model’ is on collective entrepreneurship, through outcomes of collaboration among 
business, government and academic actors. This approach, like that of Feldman and 
Francis (2006), emphasises changes from self-organising systems to more formal and 
intentional interactions between agents (see also Garnsey and Lawton Smith 1998). 
 
Infrastructure 
In some contexts, a major economic contribution to the local environment of high-
tech firms is the provision of incubators and science parks. This is one of a number of 
means by which universities might stimulate regional economic development 
(Goldstein 2009). Mostly this is a passive activity but in some cases, science parks 
and incubators are proactive in a number of the other six ways this can occur 
including transfer of know-how and technological innovation. 
 
Social interaction and networks 
Increases in formal networking are associated with the rise of high tech economies 
demonstrating a demand for local resources such as information and also economic 
transactions (see Lawton Smith et al 2012). These can also be seen as a proxy for the 
rise of informal networks – but which unlike formal networking activity cannot be 
measured. Both formal and informal networks are argued to be key mechanisms 
through which external economies benefit local firms and are ultimately responsible 
for the emergence, growth and success of a cluster of innovative firms (Breschi and 
Malerba 2005, see also Lawton Smith and Romeo 2012).  
 
Governance 
The concept of a regional innovation organiser (ROI) (Etkzowitz and Klosten 2005) is 
a governance model. Governance is co-ordinated though a group of people or an 
organisation which draws in other key stakeholders.  Sometimes universities may be 
the ROI in formulating a knowledge-based regional economic development strategy, 
for example SUNY Stoneybrook in New York State in the US and Linkoping in 
Sweden (Ektzowitz and Klofsten 2008). More often the university is part of a broader 
configuration of actors in a regional system of governance.  
 
In the later development of the innovating regions approach, that of ‘regional triple 
helix spaces’ (Etzkowitz 2008, 82), governance systems consist of the set of political 
organisations, industrial entities, and academic institutions that work together to 
improve the local conditions for innovation, forming ‘the regional triple helix’. This 
interpretation unlike the innovating regions approach is non-linear: actions are taken 
in any order with any one used as a basis for the development of the others. It is 
similarly a phased approach during which institutional roles and relationships may 
change. Three phases are identified: creation of a knowledge space – collaboration 
among different actors to improve local conditions for innovation; creation of a 
consensus space, ideas are generated in a triple helix of multiple reciprocal 
relationships among institutional sectors (academic, public, private) involving 
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localised formal and informal networking or what can be termed ‘social 
agglomeration’); and creation of an innovation space – attempts at realising the goals 
articulated in the previous phase and attracting venture capital.  
 
A number of caveats to assumptions of seamless interconnections between the above 
and path dependent localised economic development need to be introduced before 
discussion of Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire. Firstly, there is limited evidence of 
the importance of universities as a source of entrepreneurs in a region. Entrepreneurs 
from other backgrounds, even in such sectors as biotechnology, are far more 
numerous. Moreover, the focus on systems ignores the peculiarities and leverage of 
independent actors (individuals, organisations).  
 
Secondly, the impact of universities relies on a match between the university and 
regional conditions. This is contingent on factors such as the type of university and its 
academic research, and the local industrial structure (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen 
2010). Thirdly, regions can be relatively successful without key organisations 
working together. For example, in the case of premier universities such as Oxbridge, 
strategic science (Rip 2002) always has a local or contextualised component. It 
contributes to the “glocalisation” of the region with the effect of universities 
becoming internationally recognised attraction poles for research and commercial 
activities rather than because of systemic local engagement.  Fourthly, when 
organisations do collaborate, their actions do not necessarily lead to successful 
(systemic) outcomes over the longer term.  Finally, it is necessary to separate events 
from general processes, some of which may be driven by ‘top down’ initiatives by 
national governments which may not have strong local outcomes.   
 
Next, the rise of the Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire entrepreneurial regions are 
described using the framework above. In doing so, agency of individuals and 
organisations and their consequences are explored.  
 
3. Oxfordshire and the Cambridgeshire sub-region as 
entrepreneurial regions 
 
3.1 Context 
 
Oxfordshire and the Cambridgeshire sub-region are two of a small number of places, 
such as Silicon Valley and Route 128 in the USA where there is a local impact of 
research universities (Lendel 2010).  Both are located some 60 miles from London: 
Oxford to the west and Cambridge to the north. As well as their premier universities, 
each city-region has a post-1992 university (former polytechnics) (Oxford Brookes 
and Anglia Ruskin University). They qualify as triple helix regions because of their 
concentrations of university, public and private sector research, high tech 
entrepreneurship and the highly-skilled. Both locations are relatively new centres of 
high technology industry in predominately rural counties. Neither was in the top 19 
counties of high technology industry in 1981 (Hall 1985) and R&D did not feature in 
the list of key sectors in the City of Oxford in that year. As is shown, they have 
similar but diverging growth trajectories. 
 
In this paper, early data, up to 2010 is used to compare the counties of Oxfordshire 
and Cambridgeshire. More recent data compares the county of Oxfordshire with the 
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Cambridge Sub-region which comprises (Cambridgeshire, South Cambs, 
Huntingdonshire, Forest Heath, North Herts and Uttlesford). It should therefore be 
born in mind that while the counties of Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire have similar 
populations, the Cambridgeshire sub-region is larger (792,200) compared to 653,900 
(2011).  
 
The rationale for the difference in unit of analysis is that Oxfordshire’s high-tech 
economy falls within an administrative entity (the county). In contrast, as high tech 
activity in Cambridgeshire high tech activity has grown, it has spilled over into in a 
number of districts that include those in neighbouring counties, largely through 
planning decisions to protect the green belt around the city of Cambridge. Land 
ownership and planning restrictions have also played a part in where activity can be 
located in both university cities. 
 
3.2 Entrepreneurs, clusters and anchor firms 
Measuring the number of new high tech firms and monitoring their survival over time, 
is problematic. In Oxfordshire, the criterion used in the original study (Lawton Smith 
1990) was that firms were undertaking research and development (R&D) in one or 
more of science, computer science and engineering.  This definition was compatible 
that used for the Institute for Manufacturing’s database of high tech firms, a 
collaboration between Cambridgeshire County Council and Garnsey which has lasted 
over 20 years (see Mohr and Garnsey 2010). Maintaining such a database was not 
possible in Oxfordshire. Since 2003 Oxfordshire data have been compiled on 
Butchart-based definitions by the Oxfordshire Economic Observatory (OEO). The 
most recent comparisons of the two locations here are made using official national 
statistics.  These use two definitions of high-tech industry one narrow (Eurostat) and 
one wider (Eurostat +) (Appendix A) which are equivalent to standard industrial 
classifications. The use of the latter serves to provide a more inclusive picture of high-
tech activity which includes medium-tech manufacturing and therefore better reflects 
the broader range of technology-based entrepreneurship in each locations. 
 
From the early 1980s both locations emerged as high tech clusters because they 
generated new firms (Feldman and Francis 2006, Etzkowitz and Klofsten 2005). 
Some grew to major technology-based companies (see Garnsey and Lawton Smith 
1998, Mohr and Garnsey 2010) but nothing on the scale of firms in Silicon Valley, or 
even . The publication of Cambridge Phenomenon: the growth of a university town 
(Segal Quince and Partners 1985) in part led to Cambridgeshire’s profile as a leading 
cluster of high tech firms or ‘knowledge space’, but was not, as was suggested in the 
report, outperforming Oxford. In 1987 Oxfordshire had 182 high tech firms 
employing 10,695 compared to 200 employing a similar number in Cambridge (see 
Lawton Smith 1990). A recent update of the original Oxfordshire study (Lawton 
Smith and Romeo 2012) has found around two-thirds of the companies still operate, 
many of them university spin-offs (see below). Nearly 40 percent are under the same 
ownership.  By 1997, Oxfordshire had 543 firms employing 19,465 compared to 
Cambridge where there were 736 firms employing 20,792.  
 
A difference in their economies at that time was that Oxfordshire, unlike the 
Cambridge sub-region was still a centre of food manufacture, blankets and 
particularly in the post-war period, automobile manufacture). Until the late 1960s, 
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Oxfordshire’s dominant sector was the automotive industry with some 28,000 
employees, but was contracting rapidly in the 1980s.  In contrast, Cambridgeshire’s 
economy until the 20
th
 century was linked to its importance as a market town. Oxford 
is still the home of the BMW Mini plant which employs some 4000 people. The 
importance of the automotive industry to the early high tech economy was that there 
was a supply of precision engineering firms available to the early high tech 
manufacturing firms such as Oxford Instruments. There is, however, no evidence of 
interchange of personnel between the high-tech and automobile sectors. Instead, it 
was the national laboratories that were (and still are) a source of technicians for the 
high tech firms (Lawton Smith 1990).   
 
It was in the 1990s that both high tech economies grew very quickly. Where they 
differed in the late 1990s was that Oxfordshire had twice the proportion of firms with 
over 100 employees than did Cambridgeshire, mainly engineering firms (see Garnsey 
and Lawton Smith 1998). At that time the larger Grenoble region (1m people) had 
950 companies employing 23,400 (Lawton Smith 2003), showing that proportionally 
the two English counties were outperforming the longer established cluster in France.  
 
By the end of 2001, the number of Oxfordshire’s high-tech firms had risen nearly 
threefold to contribute around 12% of all employees working in the county (Chadwick 
et al 2003). At this ‘consolidation’ or ‘self-organisation’ stage (Feldman and Francis 
2006) the county had the fastest rate of employment growth in high-tech sectors in the 
UK. Over the decade 1991-2000, particularly between 1996 and 2000 high tech 
employment increased by 82%, the fastest of any of the 46 English counties. This was 
mostly in service sectors, often neglected in analyses of high tech economies, while 
manufacturing growth was concentrated in a few high-tech sectors such as cryogenics 
and instrumentation more generally, and motorsport. In Cambridge similar 
developments in the cluster were shaped by waves of firms entering into various 
sectors (Mohr and Garnsey 2010). Early waves of electronics and manufacturing were 
followed by waves of firms in instrumentation, IT, biology, telecommunication and 
R&D.  
The two regions now differ in the extent and diversity of clustering, hence of the 
degrees of technologically related variety (Boschma 2011), hence degree of 
dependence on particular sectors. It is likely to be an advantage to have high LQs in 
fastest growing sectors with the potential for knowledge spillovers from related 
variety for example through recruitment (see Breschi and Lissoni 2003, Faggian et al 
2009).   
 
Oxfordshire specialises in a small range of sectors. A total of six high LQ sectors 
account for 65% of wider-defined high-tech employment.  Sectors with the highest 
LQs are Computers and peripheral equipment (11.4) compared to the still high 4.6 in 
the Cambridge sub-region, Irradiation/electromedical equipment (6.7) (related to the 
presence of the national laboratories, see below) and scientific research & 
development (3.9). Oxfordshire also has a lower percentage of employment in high-
tech sectors than the (larger) Cambridge sub-region (6.4% compared with 9.1%), but 
higher than the national average of 4.8% (Table 2). Publishing activities, publishing 
of and software publishing for example are important to the economy. In 2011, some 
5,500 people were employed in these sectors, many of them in Oxford University 
Press which dates back to 1586 when the university was given the right to print books. 
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It is a department of Oxford University, is its earliest spin-off company and is the 
largest university publishing company in the world.  
 
Number of Employees Oxfordshire Cambridge England 
High & Medium High-Tech 
Manufacturing 13,500 16,900 695,600 
High-Tech & Selected Other KI Services 29,400 36,300 1,414,200 
Total: Wider High-Tech Sectors 42,900 53,200 2,109,800 
Total Employees (All Sectors) 311,900 343,700 22,490,000 
As % of Total Employees Oxfordshire Cambridge England 
High & Medium High-Tech 
Manufacturing 4.3 4.9 3.1 
High-Tech & Selected Other KI Services 9.4 10.6 6.3 
Total: Wider High-Tech Sectors 13.8 15.5 9.4 
Table 2 - Employees in High-Tech Sectors (Wider Definition), Oxfordshire & Comparators, 2010 
 
Source: ONS, Business Register & Employment Survey (NOMIS). High-tech & medium high-tech 
manufacturing: 2007 SIC  20-21, 25.4, 26-29, 30 (except 30.1), 32.5. High-tech & selected other 
knowledge intensive services: 2007 SIC 58-63, 71-72, 74.1, 74.9. Figures for total employees exclude 
farm-based agriculture (2007 SIC class 01000). All figures are rounded to the nearest hundred 
employees. 
 
The Cambridge sub-region is more diversified having a larger number of high LQ 
high-tech sectors (11 out of the 20 high-tech SIC categories have an LQ of 1.5 or 
above). Other specialisations with a LQ of over 4 include consumer electronics, 
communication equipment and optical instruments. With the addition of medium 
high-tech manufacturing sectors and selected other knowledge intensive services to 
the Eurostat high-tech sectors, total employment in high-tech sectors in Oxfordshire is 
more than doubled to just under 43,000. Although the percentage of employment in 
wider-defined high-tech sectors is lower than in the Cambridgeshire sub-region the 
relative differential is much smaller than with the narrower Eurostat definition (13.8% 
compared with 15.5%). This narrower differential reflects the inclusion of important 
Oxfordshire sectors such as motor vehicle manufacture, medical instruments and 
publishing in the wider high-tech definition. 
In biotechnology Oxford, Cambridge and London were identified in the Report on 
'Biotechnology Clusters' by Lord Sainsbury, Minister for Science, published in 
August 1999. By 2011 the number of Oxfordshire’s firms had risen to some 84 
companies. Cambridge has also maintained its position as one of the largest UK 
clusters of biotech firms (Breznitz 2011, Mohr and Garnsey 2010) with a LQ of 6.7 
compared to only 1.59 in Oxfordshire. However, in neither case are home grown 
biotech companies of any major size, but this is also the case for UK biotech 
companies as a whole (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen 2010). The relationship 
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between the failure of this sector to growth and the universities in both locations is 
discussed in 3.5 below. 
 
The dynamics of growth of firms and the percentage of employment in larger, anchor 
firms is similar. In both locations, high growth firms were small in number until the 
mid-1990s. Thereafter, their contribution rose sharply, and some, although not very 
many (in Cambridge, 39 or 3% of the total number of high-tech firms which account 
for 24% of jobs created between 1988 and 2008) (Mohr and Garnsey 2012).  In 
Cambridge, four local start-ups have achieved considerable growth to employ more 
than 1000 employees: Domino (ink jet printing), Autonomy (search engines), ARM 
(chip design) and Cambridge Silicon Radio (semi-conductors). At their peak they 
employed 6000 and had a combined turnover on £1.4bn. Although each went through 
periods of setback in 2002-2008, they showed less volatile growth than smaller ones, 
and provided stability to the high tech economies as ‘anchor firms’ as did 
Oxfordshire’s largest high tech firms.  
 
In Oxfordshire, the impact of Oxford University on the local economy is evident 
because the largest high-tech firms originated in Oxford University, formed by staff 
or former students, mainly from departments of Engineering Science and Metallurgy 
but with some from medical research and life sciences (see below).  
In both locations, merger and acquisition (M&A) has changed the locus of agency 
with non-local ownership affecting the potential for local engagement by the 
acquiring firms in any ‘regional triple helix space’. In Oxfordshire as well as 
Cambridgeshire foreign firms, often from the US and mainland Europe, particularly in 
the biotech sector (DTI, 2005; Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen 2010) is common.  In 
Cambridge half of acquisition of indigenous firms was by foreign firms, a trend which 
intensified in the 1990s (Mohr and Garnsey 2010). In Oxfordshire, a quarter of firms 
that existed in the 1980s had been so acquired by 2010 (Lawton Smith and Romeo 
2012). 
 
3.3 Labour markets 
 
An indicator of the potential for high levels of entrepreneurship is the profile of 
educational attainment of the workforce compared to national levels.  The locations 
are unique in the UK in that both have a significantly higher proportion of well-
qualified residents than most of the rest of England & Wales. This is particularly the 
case in Oxfordshire, which has a higher rate of degree level attainment than any 
county council or Local Enterprise Partnership; 55 per cent of residents hold degrees 
in Oxford which ranks 5
th
 of all 380 local authority districts in England, two other 
districts rank in the top 50. In the Cambridge sub-region, over half (52 per cent) of 
working age residents hold degree level qualifications leading to ranking 12
th,   
but no 
other district is ranked in the top 50.  
 
This pattern in part reflects the relatively high proportions of Oxbridge graduates, and 
those of Oxford Brookes, who stay in their respective local areas post-graduation. 
London is the second most popular destination for graduates both as well as for other 
universities. Oxfordshire and the South East are popular destinations for graduates 
from across the UK but this is not the case for the East of England which includes 
Cambridge. Assessing impact on the local labour market, however, is not straight 
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forward: there is a lack of evidence on the differences in the extent to which students 
to stay and work in occupations outside academia in a region after graduation (Waters 
and Lawton Smith 2011). 
 
A further important aspect of the labour market which relates to the locations’ 
economic dynamism is the level of overseas workers employed in the localities and in 
the student bodies and academic staff in the Oxbridge universities. Both have been 
found to be associated with levels of entrepreneurship (Breschi and Lissoni 2009). For 
example, nearly 24 percent of people working in Oxford city have come from abroad, 
making it the 8
th
 highest English borough with in-migrant workers.  Oxbridge 
universities are highly international, but more so in Oxford than Cambridge (40% 
compared to 25% of staff are citizens of foreign countries, coming from almost 100 
different countries and territories).  
 
3.4 Entrepreneurial universities and research institutions 
 
Like Silicon Valley, the two locations have multiple knowledge bases (Etzkowitz and 
Klofsten 2005): prestigious universities with similar patterns of university spin-offs 
and public and private research laboratories.  Their impact on the dynamism of the 
economies varies. In each there are elements of systemic features shaping the 
trajectory of each region but some events have non-linear effects and do not 
contribute directly to regional triple helix spaces (Etzkowitz 2008) in either place. 
 
3.4.1 The universities 
 
The historic universities Oxford and Cambridge dominate their respective cities. 
Oxford can be dated back to the 11
th
 century, with Cambridge rather younger, being 
formed 1209 when a group of Oxford University academics went to Cambridge after 
disputes between students and townspeople. There they established what became the 
University of Cambridge.  A distinctive feature of both is their collegiate systems 
(over 40 in each). Each college is an independent institution with its own property and 
income. Many of them are wealthy. They appoint their own staff and are responsible 
for selecting students, in accordance with University regulations. The teaching of 
students is shared between the Colleges and University departments. Degrees are 
awarded by the University.  
 
Hence the question of agency and assumptions about the workings of a regional triple 
helix model (Etzkowitz 2008) is not as simple as if the two ‘universities’ were 
coherent entities. The formal rather than the informal process by which both have 
become entrepreneurial universities (Etzkowitz 1983) followed different routes. Both 
formal systems have recent their problems which appear to have limited their impact 
on the growth of their respective high tech economies. 
 
The university spin-off process from Oxford University has a long history. Some 
spin-offs were established in the 1940s and early 1950s but in the 1970s and 1980s 
the number of university start-ups increased. By the mid-1980s, some 40 firms had 
been established broadly defined as spin-offs (see Lawton Smith and Ho 2006). They 
include Oxford Instruments (scientific, industrial and medical devices) which employs 
nearly 2000 people worldwide;  Research Machines, the UK’s leading educational 
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computer manufacturer (1973); and  Sophos (1981) (antivirus software) which by 
2012 employed 1682.   
 
Internal pressures on Oxford University to capitalise on the growing number of spin-
outs rather than just the entrepreneurs becoming rich resulted in important events. The 
first was the establishment of its wholly-owned technology transfer company in 1987 
as Oxford University Research and Development Ltd and renamed it as Isis 
Innovation in 1988.  Its main activities at formation were the Isis Angels Network 
which provides a vehicle for the introduction of private individuals and companies 
with potential interest in investing in university spin-out companies, and the Oxford 
Innovation Society, set up in 1990 provided networking events for scientists and 
potential funders/acquirers of university research.  It was not then geared up to 
promoting the formation of spin-offs.  
 
The second was the Review of Technology Transfer Arrangements in 1994 (Report 
published 1995). This was a response by the University to internal pressures to review 
its policies as well as a response to the national political agenda. The Report 
recommended that the University assert its rights to the IP of academics, students and 
visitors (Lawton Smith 2003), with a consequence that a more professional 
commercialisation organisation was required. From 1997 onwards there were 
opportunities for academic staff to form their spin-outs through Isis Innovation who 
were obliged by their contracts of employment to do so. The first CEO was a locally 
well-known serial entrepreneur.  Under his leadership, by the mid-2000s, Isis 
Innovation grew to having the largest number of commercialisation staff of any UK 
university (Minshall and Wicksteed 2005). 
 
Isis now employs more than 60 people, in three main parts: Isis Innovation, the main 
organisation, Oxford University Consulting (OUC) and Isis Enterprise – a 
consultancy company which focuses on technology transfer. In 2008, Isis Innovation 
established Oxford Spin-out Equity Management to manage the University’s interests 
in its spin-out companies. In 2012 Isis returned £5.3m to the university and its 
researchers on a turnover of £10.2m, hence for Oxford University is a successful 
operation. Isis Innovation has been responsible for creating over 70 spin-out 
companies based on academic research generated within and owned by the University 
of Oxford, and has spun-out a new company every two months on average with five 
formed in 2012.  Since 2000 over £266 million in external investment has been raised 
by Isis spin-out companies, and in 2013 five were currently listed on London’s AIM 
market.
1
  
 
While the rate of spin-off has not slowed, there is evidence of relatively poor recent 
performance with fewer surviving, more becoming inactive, no spin-off has yet 
reached the magic £bn turnover figure. Many, usually biotech companies, have been 
acquired by overseas, usually US companies. Moreover, there has been no biotech 
IPO since 2006 (Lawton Smith 2012).  Hence, there is little evidence that the 
formalisation of the technology transfer process created the kinds of large firms that 
were established in the past. 
 
                                                 
1
 http://isis-innovation.com/documents/IsisAnnualReport2012.pdf accessed January 13 2013 
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During the 1990s Cambridge University also took steps to simplify the technology 
transfer system ‘to ensure greater efficiency and professionalism’ (Breznitz 2011). 
However, like Oxford in recent years, the outcome was far from effective, resulting in 
negative attitudes towards the technology transfer office (TTO) and a reduced number 
of spinouts. The creation of the Cambridge-MIT institute in 1999 was followed by 
restructuring of technology transfer units. In 1983 the Wolfson Industrial Liaison Unit 
(WILO) established by the Department of Engineering in 1970 as its own technology 
transfer unit, became responsible for the commercialisation of university research as a 
whole. In 2000, the WILO merged with Research Grants and Contracts Office to form 
the Research Services Division, which operated several divisions dealing with 
sponsored research from research councils, charities and industry, including the 
WILO which became the TTO. In 2002 with HEIF Funding, a new unit called 
Cambridge Enterprise, the Isis Innovation equivalent, was founded as an independent 
unit but it went into the RSD in 2003, and following changes to the university’s IPR 
policy in 2005 the merged body became a single organisation. Cambridge adopted a 
very similar set of rules to those which existed at Oxford: it would receive all control 
over inventions regardless of the source of funding. In principle this would encourage 
entrepreneurship, licensing and other forms of commercialisation because of the 
greater academic freedom to place their inventions in the public domain.  
 
Breznitz (2011) instead finds that the changes have had a negative effect on industry’s 
ability to negotiate with the current technology transfer system which has not been 
fully integrated because of the volume of changes and key individuals were less 
visible. In the past, high profile individuals such as the head of St John’s College 
Innovation centre, the former director of the WILO were well known inside and 
outside of the university. Moreover, the formula for sharing income favours licensing 
over spinouts. Breznitz argues that far from the changes enabling Cambridge to be 
more integrated into regional innovation systems (local, regional), they were one 
sided and not made in consideration of the impact of the relationships with industry. 
Therefore assumptions associated with regional innovation systems approaches, 
including relationships with actors in the region, sharing information, knowledge flow, 
social capital and social networks were absent, leading to antagonism, for example, on 
the part of the local biotech industry, entrepreneurs and venture capitalists. This 
arguably has limited the impact of the university on local economic development 
through technology transfer, predicted in both the innovating regions (Ektowitz and 
Klofsten 2005) and the regional triple helix model (Etzkowitz 2008). 
 
As in Oxfordshire, in Cambridge, Mohr and Garnsey (2010) show that unofficial 
start-ups by members of the university (staff and graduates) outnumbered official 
start-ups in which the university held a stake, both types of firms have provided a 
continuous supply of technology-based firms to the local economy. Moreover, the 
authors identified further spin-offs from previous university spin-offs providing 
evidence of the impact of serial entrepreneurship. In Oxfordshire seriality appears to 
be primarily related to angel investors, recruitment of senior managers and multiple 
board memberships (Lawton Smith 2008).  
 
Oxbridge universities’ business schools have established programmes and societies to 
encourage academic and student entrepreneurship.  In 2001 central government 
funding enabled Oxford to set up the Oxford Science Enterprise Centre (OxSEC) in 
the Said Business School with the central tenet of promoting entrepreneurship within 
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the university. The Said Business School has sought to add value through 
entrepreneurship education in three specific areas: Teaching Entrepreneurship, 
Knowledge Transfer, and Links to Business. All programmes are open to Oxford-
based entrepreneurs, high-tech companies as well as to university members. The 
number of people being trained is rising steeply, with over 3000 people attending an 
event each year (Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen 2012). The Cambridge equivalent is 
Judge Institute of Management’s Cambridge University Centre for Entrepreneurial 
Learning
2
. This ‘aims to spread the spirit of enterprise through the creation and 
delivery of educational activities that inspire and build skills in the practice of 
entrepreneurship’.  From the evidence above, training provided by the universities to 
local and national high-tech economies is likely to be more significant in the future 
than university spin-offs. 
 
Student entrepreneurs clubs are symbolic of a rise in interest in entrepreneurship 
within student communities but their direct impact is less obvious. Oxford 
Entrepreneurs, a network for students and alumni of the University of Oxford, aimed 
at encouraging and supporting student entrepreneurship followed in 2002, now has 
over 7000 members, the largest student entrepreneurship society in Europe.  
Cambridge University Entrepreneurs was started in 1999 as a society for student 
entrepreneurs. By 2012 it had awarded £500k in prize money to more than 40 start-
ups which have a very small impact on the local economy creating only some 110 full 
time jobs
3
. 
 
3.4.2 research laboratories  
 
Oxfordshire has more government-funded research laboratories, with specialisms in 
physics than Cambridgeshire (Table 3).  Its research laboratories were established 
post-World War II, firstly to service the UK’s nuclear energy programme (UK 
Atomic Energy Authority, UKAEA, first nuclear fission and now only fusion 
research), making it more similar to its twin town Grenoble in France than the 
Cambridge sub-region (Lawton Smith 2003).  Over time, the composition of this 
scientific research, its ownership and orientation has changed. It was always ‘big 
science’ but has developed into a more of a ‘regional triple helix space’, with an 
emphasis on commercial activity as well as pure science.  
 
                                                 
2
 http://www.enforbusiness.com/focus/education-and-training/centre-entrepreneurial-learning-cfel-
university-cambridge?page=1 accessed January 13 2013 
3
 http://www.cue.org.uk/about/ 
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Harwell Organisation 
RAL (Rutherford Appleton Laboratory) 
materials and structures, light sources, astronomy 
and particle physics. 
- Space science 
- Diamond Light Source Facility 
(Synchrotron Radiation) 
- ISIS (physical and life sciences) 
STFC 
ESA UK Harwell Centre 
(space research) 
 
 
European Space Agency (ESA)  
NRPB laboratory National Radiological Protection Board 
Radiation And Genome Stability Unit Medical Research Council 
MRC Harwell 
(Mouse genetics) 
Medical Research Council 
Centre for Ecology and Hydrology NERC (National Environment Research Council) 
 
Culham  
Culham  UKAEA 
JET (Joint European Torus) EU - European Fusion Development Agreement 
Table 3 Public sector research laboratories 
 
The Harwell site now operates as the Harwell Science and Innovation Campus, one of 
the UK's two National Science and Innovation Campuses. It is a public-private 
partnership, and operates as a combined research and innovation park which in 2013 
hosted 150 organisations and companies, employing over 4,500
4
. In a neighbouring 
district are two nuclear fusion research laboratories.  The campus forms part of a sub-
region to the south of the county known as Science Vale UK, a collaboration between 
Harwell, Milton Park (the largest business/science park in the county), two local 
district councils (Vale of White Horse and South Oxfordshire)
5
, the Oxfordshire Local 
Economic Partnership, Oxfordshire County Council and the Science and Technology 
Facilities Council (STFC). While the atomic energy laboratories have contracted, the 
activities of RAL have continued to expand in both basic science, for example in 
skills training and technology transfer, while other laboratories have located onto the 
site.  
 
Reflecting this concentration of science, the Vale of White Horse district, the location 
of Milton Park and the Harwell Science and Innovation campus, has three times the 
national average (4.3%) of the percentage of employment in high-tech sectors, at 
14.3%, and reflects particular strengths in the district in computer, electronic and 
optical products, computer related activities and scientific research and development. 
In absolute terms, the district accounts for 39% of Oxfordshire’s high-tech 
employment on the narrow definition and 29% on the Eurostat + definition. In this 
respect the Science Vale UK initiative shows how the policy involvement is being 
attracted to both private and public sector excellence and represents the potential of 
this scientific ‘regional triple helix space’.  This potential is being reinforced by 
central government funding since its award in 2011 of Enterprise Zone status under 
                                                 
4
 http://harwelloxford.com/business-directory accessed 13 January 2013 
5
 http://www.sciencevale.com/ accessed 13 January 2013 
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which businesses are eligible for a business rates discount of up to £55,000 a year for 
five years.
6
 In Cambridgeshire a former airfield, Alconbury, located 24 miles west of 
Cambridge has been given the Enterprise Zone status but is in a remote location rather 
than being embedded in a regional triple helix space. 
 
In contrast, Cambridgeshire has a stronger private sector research base than 
Oxfordshire, which may have an impact on the future trajectory of the region. 
Examples are shown in Table 4.  In both, the 1980s and 1990s was marked by the 
arrival of a number of high-tech firms from other parts of the UK and R&D 
departments of overseas companies. A notable closure in Cambridge was that of 
AT&T’s European laboratory in April 2002. Pfizer is partnering with the 
Cardiovascular Epidemiology Unit (CEU) at the University of Cambridge in the U.K. 
to establish an embedded collaboration. 
 
 
Cambridge Oxford 
Toshiba Research Europe Limited 1991 Sharp European Laboratory 1990 
Microsoft Research Cambridge 
1997 
Infineum (petrol additives) 
formerly Esso Research Centre 
The Nokia Research Centre   
Philips Research laboratory (Home Healthcare 
initiatives) 
 
Kodak European Research  
Table 4 Examples of private sector research laboratories 
 
 
Both have a number of world leading research laboratories mainly specialising in 
biomedical science, supported by charities and government funded research councils, 
sometimes in association with the universities (Table 5). Although, these 
concentrations of expertise have not led to the formation of major biotech companies, 
that is not necessarily the most appropriate indicator of their societal importance. 
More telling is presence in Cambridge (and absence in Oxford) of big pharma which 
suggests that co-location is crucial to the technology transfer process and that in this 
respect, Cambridge is a stronger triple helix space than Oxford. 
 
Consequences of the growth and change of the science base are twofold. First, the 
different organisations’ presence and changing orientation contribute to a greater or 
lesser degree to all of Etzkowitz and Kloftsten’s (2005) four stages of the growth of 
an innovating region. Where those organisations become innovating institutions as 
well as scientific research institutions, this has a knock on effect on the dynamics of 
the localities becoming ‘innovating regions’ characterised by technological renewal.   
Second, they have a changing impact on the supply of and demand for skills within 
the local labour market.  
                                                 
6
 http://www.sciencevale.com/ accessed February 222 2013 
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Cambridge Oxford 
Strangeways Research Laboratory 
genetic epidemiology: independent charity, sole 
trustee is University of Cambridge.  
Laboratory houses the independent Foundation 
for Genomics and Population Health (PHG 
Foundation). 
Other research groups within the building are 
supported by the Medical Research Council and 
European Commission 
 
Oxford Stem Cell Institute (Oxford University) 
Institute of Public Health - Cambridge University, 
the MRC and the NHS 
Oxford Biomedical Research Centre,  
partnership between the University of Oxford and 
Oxford Radcliffe Hospitals, funded by the 
National Institute of Health Research 
Babraham Institute 
(healthcare and training) Biotechnology and 
Biological Sciences Research Council 
Oxford Centre for Cancer Medicine 
European Bioinformatics Institute Institute of Biomedical Engineering 
Laboratory of Molecular Biology Jenner Institute (vaccines) 
 Wellcome Centre for Human Genetics. 
 
Table 5 Examples of charitable and other research labs 
 
 
3.5 Infrastructure 
 
The provision of space on university science parks and incubators is now a defining 
feature of both locations’ high-tech entrepreneurship infrastructure. Both the Oxford 
Science Park (Magdalen College 1990) and Oxford University’s own Science Park at 
Begbroke established in 2000 have incubators. Begbroke is several miles away from 
the city centre, and combines space with outreach and entrepreneurship activities 
including the Centre for Innovation and Enterprise, the Enterprise Fellowship scheme 
and the development of new courses with the Department of Continuing Professional 
Development. However, Milton Park has more firms including more university spin-
offs than either of the two university parks (Lawton Smith and Glasson 2010). 
 
The Cambridge Science Park (Trinity College 1970) was also developed by a 
university college rather than the university itself, but does not have an incubator. St 
John’s College incubator provides that service (Breznitz 2011)7. Cambridge 
University was able to build a Bio-Medical Campus, one of the largest centres of 
heath science and medical research in Europe on land it owns in the city and therefore 
was not subject to the same planning restrictions as if it was on newly acquired land.  
At the time of writing, Oxford University is in the process of developing a much 
smaller incubator on land it owns on the edge of the city. 
 
3.6 networks 
An indicator of formal (and informal) interaction, between entrepreneurs in the two 
economies and hence of mature stages of high-tech based regional development 
                                                 
7
 http://www.stjohns.co.uk/ 
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(Feldman and Francis 2006) is the rapid rise in the number of formal networks.  By 
2008 Oxfordshire had 65 and Cambridgeshire 59 formal networks, ranging from large 
and highly specialised networks to smaller networks, for example breakfast clubs. In 
Cambridge the largest network is the Cambridge Network which organises its own 
events and acts as an umbrella organization for other networks. Its members include 
One Nucleus, which is a membership organisation for international life science and 
healthcare companies, based in Cambridge and London 
8
. In both, networking is 
particularly strong in the biotech sector. In Oxfordshire, Oxfordshire Bioscience 
Network (OBN) has replaced the Oxfordshire BiotechNet as the formal network for 
the sector.   
 
Oxfordshire and Cambridgeshire each had focal points for formal networking in their 
incipient or emergent stages.  Both provided incubator space and later supported 
business angel networks. In Oxfordshire networking began in 1985 when the Oxford 
Trust (now Science Oxford), was established by Sir Martin and Lady Audrey Wood 
(founders of Oxford Instruments). This is a charitable trust whose mission is 
‘encouraging the study, application and communication of science, technology and 
engineering’.  Participants included university-based and national laboratory 
entrepreneurs but there was no formal tie to either of Oxford’s universities.  
 
Similar developments occurred in Cambridge somewhat later but this time based at a 
University of Cambridge college  St John’s College opened the St John’s Innovation 
Centre in 1987 which does act as an incubator and as a focal point for networking and 
interfacing with regional, national and international technology transfer programmes 
(Waters and Lawton Smith 2002). Over time a different landscape with other actors 
taking the lead has emerged in both locations, with the Oxbridge universities 
becoming more active as sites for networking, especially in their business schools (see 
below). 
 
3.7 Governance 
Two aspects of the extent to which regional triple helix spaces exist relate to specific 
political and institutional/organisational environments and the degree to which the 
universities engage in them.  First, decisions made at the national level on systems of 
government have profoundly changed key actors and their agency at local levels. 
Following the change of UK government in May 2010, the regional development 
agencies (RDAs) established in 1999 were abolished. They have been replaced by 
Local Economic Partnerships, ‘joint local authority/business bodies that reflect 
genuine economic areas to promote local economic development’. They are intended 
to represent the core actors in a region. Those in the two regions differ in the scale: 
the Oxfordshire LEP is countywide but the equivalent in Cambridgeshire is the 
Greater Cambridge, Greater Peterborough Enterprise Partnership which covers a 
much wider area with a population of 1.3 million
9
. Cambridge University is 
represented on the board by the Cavendish Professor of Physics, also an experienced 
business man, at the University of Cambridge, and Anglia Ruskin by the Vice 
Chancellor. The two universities in the Oxford LEP are both represent at Pro-Vice 
Chancellor level. 
 
                                                 
8
 http://www.cambridgenetwork.co.uk/directories/327/ (accessed 13 January 2013 
9
 http://www.yourlocalenterprisepartnership.co.uk/ (accessed February 24
th
 201) 
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Second, neither Oxbridge university can be seen as an ROI. As a core actor, Oxford 
University’s engagement in local economic development has been limited and has not 
changed in any major way from a position of not seeing the local hinterland as being 
of interest (Lawton Smith 1991). In 1999, however, the university appointed a 
Regional Liaison Director who was initially on secondment from Barclays Bank, but 
later funded under HEIF. The Regional Liaison Office was established under his 
leadership. At the time, the appointment, “underlines the University's commitment to 
play a more prominent part in local economic development”. The office was absorbed 
into Isis Innovation in 2008. Until his retirement in September 2011, the post holder 
was the point of contact rather being someone in a position of authority. 
 
This lack of engagement is in contrast with the efforts of leading figures within 
Cambridge University and its colleges, to pull together key stakeholders to consider 
the prospects for growth in the Cambridge sub-region. Two main initiatives are the 
Cambridge Futures and Horizons. Cambridge Futures, a private sector led 
organisation, was set up in 1996 to stimulate thinking about the future development of 
Cambridge, and to influence policy decisions. It was led by the Department of 
Architecture in the University of Cambridge, but involved a wide range of senior 
people in private, public and third sectors. Horizons, a company limited by guarantee 
was created in 2004 to manage the delivery of the growth strategy for Cambridgeshire. 
Its particular contribution to the development of the Structure Plan was through its 
remit to address issues of congestion and housing shortage which were identified as 
constraints to the growth of the high tech clusters in the second Cambridge 
Phenomenon report (SQW 2000). It was an outcome of collaboration between key 
local stakeholders (although it was disbanded in 2011 as a result of withdrawal of 
government funding, SQW 2011).  Its board comprised a cross-section of partner 
representatives (elected members) and independent figures from different sectors, and 
was supported by the Joint Strategic Growth Implementation Committee (JSGIC). 
This involved all the local authorities but did not have statutory planning powers, 
which remained the preserve of the local authorities.  Although these have been 
important actions, they do not in themselves suggest the existence of a formal 
‘innovation space’ because as in Oxford, there is still fragmentation of effort both 
within the universities as well as between the universities and local government. 
 
4. Conclusions 
 
The paper addresses the research questions: how different are these apparently very 
similar sub-regions, in other words, how unique are they, and how successful are 
they? It is shown that they are examples of globally important knowledge spaces 
(Etzkowitz 2008), with high concentrations of strategic science (Rip 2002). As 
smaller centres of high technology, they are much smaller than Silicon Valley but are 
successful when the growth of the numbers of high tech firms and employees are used 
as the criteria. Although the composition of the two high tech economies differs in the 
number and sectoral composition of clusters, the scale of activity is not very different. 
Moreover, the two regions have a complement of incubators and science parks, 
although with a stronger orientation towards biomedical science in Cambridge 
compared to Oxford. The similarities between them suggest that they are not unique 
although they are inevitably different from places not dominated by world leading 
universities (see Lendel 2010).   
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Associated with the growth of the high-tech sector and key to each region’s 
adaptability is the strength, depth and mobility of their highly skilled labour market. 
The universities play no small part in this through their contribution to being 
attractive places to live and work, and more recently through formal entrepreneurship 
programmes. Both entrepreneurship and labour markets are neglected in the 
innovating regions framework (Etzkowitz and Klofsten 2005) and the regional triple 
helix spaces concept (Etzkowitz 2008).  
 
In both, stability has been provided by a small number of long-established, anchor 
firms. Also important as indicators of the dynamism of regions, an effect rather than a 
cause, is the presence of formal networks. Beyond the scope of the paper, however, is 
Schumpeterian analysis of the roles played by the entrepreneurs as the pioneers of 
change, compared with the inventors or a managers in the relationships and 
interactions between actors. 
 
It might have been predicted by the ‘innovating regions’ and the ‘regional triple helix 
spaces’ models that the Oxbridge universities would inevitably be instrumental in the 
growth of the two high tech economies as a source of important firms and in 
processes involved in governing co-ordination of growth.  This has been shown not to 
be the case.  Instead there are mismatches in how the regions might from greater 
interaction on the part of universities, form ‘regional triple spaces (see Leydesdorff 
and Zawdie 2010).  
 
Mixed evidence of the importance of university institutional arrangements in spinning 
out new firms might be expected to be a key element in their role as ‘entrepreneurial 
universities’ is found in both (Etzkowitz 1983).  While internal changes were 
important, their impact did not cause any significant systemic changes within the 
counties as might be predicted in the idea of an innovation space within the regional 
triple helix model. For example, while the largest Oxford University spin-offs 
(broadly defined) have contributed to Oxfordshire’s changing industrial structure, it 
was the entrepreneurs who gave birth to the entrepreneurial region and not ‘collective 
entrepreneurship’ involving the university per se.  Where the impact of the 
universities is most visible in both places is the establishment of incubators and 
science parks.  
 
The paper has also highlighted the importance of specificities of political and 
institutional/organisational environments. In these two locations, coordination of 
high-tech economic development has taken place largely in the absence of public 
policy at the local level. National government has provided funding for business 
networks and for technology transfer activities, including specific funding for the 
creation spin-offs. Oxfordshire’s Science Vale UK is an example of a nascent triple 
helix space similar to that developing in Grenoble, but this is not replicated at the 
level of the county. In Cambridge the university’s presence has been felt though the 
actions of university-based individuals who have played a strategic role in driving 
change.  
 
The analysis of this growth finds different kinds of systemic effects co-existing with 
events that are independent and in themselves do not bring about wider processes of 
change. The agency of individuals and of key organisations is fundamental to 
understanding the dynamism of regions. However, this has to be tempered by such 
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realities as the planning process, which in historic cities such as Oxford and 
Cambridge really matters. More broadly, Oxbridge is still far from Silicon Valley and, 
perhaps by themselves they are not enough. A better unit of analysis is the university 
triangle region of Oxford-Cambridge-London, or more broadly the European scale as 
regions which might compete with Silicon Valley.  
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Appendix A Eurostat definitions 
 
Eurostat Definition: 
 
The Eurostat definition is based on NACE Revision 2, which is identical to the UK 2007 SIC. 
Sectors are defined at the 3 digit SIC level for high-tech manufacturing and at the 2 digit level 
for high-tech knowledge intensive services. 
 
High-tech manufacturing: 
 
SIC 21.1: Basic pharmaceutical products 
SIC 21.2: Pharmaceutical preparations 
SIC 26.1: Electronic components & boards 
SIC 26.2: Computers & peripheral equipment 
SIC 26.3: Communication equipment 
SIC 26.4: Consumer electronics 
SIC 26.5: Instruments & appliances for measuring, testing & navigation; watches & clocks 
SIC 26.6: Irradiation, electromedical & electrotherapetic equipment 
SIC 26.7: Optical instruments & photographic equipment 
SIC 26.8: Magnetic & optical media 
SIC 30.3: Air & spacecraft & related machinery 
 
High-tech knowledge intensive services: 
 
SIC 59: Film & TV programme production, sound recording & music publishing 
SIC 60: Programming & broadcasting activities 
SIC 61: Telecommunications 
SIC 62: Computer programming, consultancy & related activities 
SIC 63: Information service activities 
SIC 72: Scientific research & development 
 
Appendix 1: High tech---narrower definition 
 
The wider definition extends the Eurostat definition by adding in medium high-tech 
manufacturing sectors, as defined by Eurostat at the 3 digit SIC level. Selected 
additional knowledge intensive services are also included in the wider definition, 
again defined at the 3 digit SIC level (Table 3). 
 
High-tech & medium high-tech manufacturing: 
 
As above for Eurostat definition, plus: 
 
SIC 20.1-20.6: Chemicals & chemical products 
SIC 25.4: Weapons & ammunition 
SIC 27.1-27.9: Electrical equipment 
SIC 28.1-28.9: Machinery & equipment not elsewhere classified 
SIC 29.1-29.3: Motor vehicles, parts & accessories 
SIC 30.2: Railway locomotives & rolling stock 
SIC 30.4: Military fighting vehicles 
SIC 30.9: Other transport equipment 
SIC 32.5: Medical & dental instruments & supplies 
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High-tech & selected other knowledge intensive services: 
 
As above for Eurostat definition, plus: 
 
SIC 58.1: Publishing of books, periodicals & other publishing activities 
SIC 58.2: Software publishing 
SIC 71.1: Architectural & engineering activities & related technical consultancy 
SIC 71.2: Technical testing & analysis 
SIC 74.1: Specialised design activities 
SIC 74.9: Other professional, scientific & technical activities 
Appendix 2 High-tech: wider definition 
 
 
